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EVALUATING CHANGE IN WATER INSTITUTIONS: 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND COUNTRY EXAMPLES 
 
By Marie Leigh Livingston 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wise use of water resources is central to natural resource policy and economic prosperity 
in many countries around the world.  While nations may differ in their aspirations and stages of 
development, the allocation and use of water resources is often critical to achieving specific 
regional and national goals including efficiency, equity and overall social welfare.  Because 
economic circumstances change over time, it is often necessary or desirable to change the laws 
and policy governing water allocation and use in order to solve problems and take advantage of 
opportunities.  
 Historically, physical structural projects have been relied upon to address evolving water 
conditions and changing economic needs.  More recently, policy makers have turned their 
attention to demand side management (like conservation and pricing) in an effort to use the 
resource wisely.  Most recently, analysts and policy makers have become interested in water 
institutions (laws, regulations and policy) and how they can be designed in a way to cope with 
change and facilitate the achievement of social and economic goals (Easter et. al., 1998). 
 This paper outlines the concepts economists use to evaluate how the pressure for 
institutional change develops and what dynamics are pertinent to the process of change.  From an 
economic perspective, it is tempting to reduce the study to a benefit cost analysis.  However, the 
analysis requires much more.  To gain real insight and understanding into the role and 
importance of water institutions, the analyst must know something about economics and 
political, as well as hydrology, earth sciences, history and culture.  The field is complicated and 
the analysis is usually neither elegant nor simple. 
 The overall objective is to generate some insights and ideas into why and how water 
institutions change, and what factors to look for in order to evaluate actual change at the micro 
and meso level.  The micro level refers to the fundamental forces that generate pressure for 
institutional innovation, often deriving from individual interests.  The meso level refers to the 
structure and dynamics of the actual process of institutional change, and the factors that may 
facilitate or pose obstacles to innovation. 
Throughout the paper, examples from a variety of countries are provided and described in 
order to illustrate points and lend some concreteness to the concepts.  Economists would expect 
country context to generate some diversity in the institutional approaches taken to provide access 
to, and to allocate water.  Nevertheless, there may well be some overlap in circumstances faced 
by different countries and significant opportunities to apply what has been learned from the 
experience in one country in order to address and resolve the problems faced by another.  
 
II.  EVALUATING CHANGE AT THE MICRO LEVEL 
  
 Evaluating change in water institutions requires some understanding of political 
economy.  The economic understanding of political economy is rooted in the theory of interest 
group politics.  The idea is that one must understand the perspective and interests of stakeholders 
in order to evaluate the pressure for change and also the potential impacts of actual change.   
 
Interest Group Politics 
 
 The theory of interest group politics rests upon the idea that individuals are both rational 
and self interested (Olson, 1965).  In standard economic analysis, we assume individuals with a 
stake in water use and allocation will do their best to meet their own individual objectives, within 
the existing structure of rights and laws (the initial endowment of income and other resources 
(including water).  In this case the logic is extended to assert that individuals with a stake in 
water allocation will also seek to change the rules governing allocation in a manner that 
promotes their interests.  Moreover, individuals will attempt to organize themselves with other 
like-minded parties in a concerted effort to change policy by pressuring political actors. 
 Individuals with a stake in water use and allocation are not limited to water users alone.  
Of course, municipal, agricultural and industrial water users who rely on diversions or 
extractions to operate their businesses are stakeholders.  In addition, however, stakeholders 
include non-water users that have an interest in related outputs or instream uses, like wildlife 
preservation, recreation and aesthetic environmental quality.  Obviously, the goals of interested 
parties are not always similar in that they may be either economic or non-economic goals.  Even 
when all goals are economic, conflicts between interest groups arise. 
 The ability of a particular interest group to actually organize and bring pressure to bear 
on the political system depends on, among other things, 1) the benefits and costs that will be 
incurred by individuals as a result of changing the rules and 2) the transactions cost associated 
with organizing with other individuals.  How policymakers respond to this pressure is another 
matter, which is treated in the meso level discussion.  
For example, consider a case where a large group of farmers (say two hundred) each have 
a stake of $100 in changing a particular water regulation in their favor. However, the cost of 
getting organized would involve some travel and legal costs amounting to $125 per farmer.  On 
the other hand, assume a small set of industrial users (say five) each have a $1000 stake in 
maintaining the status quo.   Also assume that the transactions cost of organizing the industrial 
users is only $150 per firm, perhaps because an annual industry meeting already exists, so that 
the potential net gain of $850 is sufficient to stimulate action.   
In this case the pressure to change institutions will never materialize, even though the 
gains to farmers ($20,000 total) far exceed the potential loss to industry ($5000), because, at the 
individual level for farmers, the costs of getting organized more than offset the potential gains, 
thereby eliminating the incentive for political action.  There are myriad combinations of groups, 
stakes and transactions costs that each generates a unique outcome in terms of political economy. 
  
Equilibrium and Evolutionary Change 
 
  Institutions are in political economic equilibrium when there is no pressure, or, more 
likely, insufficient pressure for change.  Institutions are in disequilibrium, and may change when 
the political clout of potential winners exceeds the political clout of potential losers (stakeholders 
in the status quo).  Because there is not a clear, direct and proportional relationship between 
potential economic gains and political clout, actual change may or may not enhance economic 
efficiency. 
Institutions change at different rates and in different directions in different regions and 
contexts (North, 1990).   Clearly, the natural environment is a factor.  Water institutions in arid 
countries garner substantially more attention than water policies in humid regions.  For example, 
in the U.S., in the eastern, more water rich part of the country, the riparian principle was chosen 
as the original allocation guide.  Under the riparian system, property owners have the right to 
utilize bordering streams, with no explicit limit on beneficial use.   
In the arid west, water is allocated based on prior appropriation, which requires diversion 
from the stream (perhaps to relatively remote locations), with strict limits on the amount of use.   
However, even within arid regions, institutional change has varied depending on, among other 
things, the structure of interest groups at a particular time, the cultural context from with those 
groups and their goals emerge, at the structure of leadership present.  For example, while both 
Wyoming and Colorado water law rely on prior appropriation, they have substantially different 
dispute resolution mechanisms, which were heavily influenced by the philosophy of important 
leaders at the time the laws were developed. 
Because institutions evolve incrementally over time, evaluating their performance in 
inescapably incremental as well.  There is no once and for all solution.  For example, in the 
eastern U.S., many riparian systems have gradually evolved into permit systems, as water has 
grown relatively scarce. Evaluating performance in a positive way requires some notion of 
improved consistency between social goals and institutional structure.  The principles of 
efficiency, equity and overall social welfare may be used to evaluate performance since they 
indicate the ability of various interest groups to achieve their objectives or, alternatively, face 
significant frustration. 
 
Economic Goals and Efficiency 
 
Undoubtedly, the pursuit of direct economic gain is the driving force behind many 
changes in water institutions.  Agricultural interests and other producers are often primarily in 
their profitability.  However the extent to which a particular interest group’s economic 
improvement corresponds with an overall increase in economic efficiency is only loosely related.  
If the interest group in question economic gains are offset by losses elsewhere in the system, 
their economic position may improve while overall efficiency declines. 
 It is indeed fortunate if the objectives of the politically prevailing interest group coincide 
with greater economic efficiency.  If, however, it does not, economists have a professional 
responsibility to identify opportunities to change water institutions in a way that could increase 
economic efficiency.  Once identified, the challenge becomes making persuasive arguments in 
the political arena in order to influence actual policy. 
 Institutional arrangements are critical in creating incentives because they 1) define who 
has access to water resources, 2) establish the range of (legal) choice open to legitimate water 
users, and 3) determine who can claim income from use and who will bear the cost of use.  As 
such, they are primary in terms of structuring incentives and producing the resulting economic 
outcome (Bromley, 1982).  Economists assert that given the choice domain established by water 
institutions, individual water users (and others) will behave rationally in a way that maximizes 
the achievement of their economic or non-economic goals. The interaction between users and the 
combined result defines the economic outcome at a particular point in time.   
 Because they create incentives, institutions may also pose a clear obstacle to economic 
development.  Poorly designed institutions send inaccurate signals to water users about the 
benefits and costs that accrue to the system as a result of their use and production choices.  When 
individuals respond to a partial or erroneous set of information about the economic consequences 
of their decisions, the link between individual rational choice and the improvement of overall 
economic welfare is broken.  Incentives are “perverse” and may encourage individuals to use 
water in ways that reduce overall economic net benefits to the whole.  
 Countries in the former Soviet Bloc, like Poland and the Czech Republic, provide an 
excellent, but unfortunate, example of how the lack of economic incentives can lead to seriously 
inefficient use of resources.  Certainly, in the absence of both resource and product markets, the 
political or administrative principles that guided how water was allocated between various 
industries and between industrial, domestic, and environmental uses, often led to distributions 
that were clearly inefficient from a capitalistic perspective (Livingston, Bochniarz and Bolan, 
1995). 
 
Equity 
 
 As a guiding principle, economic efficiency is powerful, but limited.  While institutional 
change is likely to increase or decrease the aggregate net benefits accruing to a society, it will 
definitely, and just as fundamentally, change the distribution of those benefits and costs.  
Because changing the incidence of benefits and costs is inescapable when water institutions 
change, equity must also be central element of evaluation methodology. 
 Quite often, equity and distributional issues are a motivating force behind interest group 
action.  Certainly, fairness issues concerning the distribution of water between agricultural and 
municipal interests are a common theme in water policy controversies around the world.  In 
affluent countries, the distribution of water use benefits between traditional (consumptive) uses 
and emerging (often environmental, non-consumptive) uses is frequently at issue.  In developing 
countries, poverty is often the key equity issue in shifting water laws and policies. 
 Equity concerns are often at the root of water policy issues where the rights of indigenous 
peoples are in question.  This theme runs across both developed and developing nations.  
Institutional issues may concern whether these groups have rights to the water or may address 
the extent of damage to which these groups may be exposed as other groups exercise their water 
rights. 
 For example, in the United States, the question of Native American water rights has been 
very controversial and has affected water allocation to a great extent in several parts of the 
country.  The Supreme Court case of Arizona vs. California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)) reaffirmed the 
Winters doctrine which establishes the water rights of Native Americans. Winters vs. United 
States (207 U.S. 564 1908) states that water rights were in fact granted to Native Americans 
when Federal reservations were established (thus the name reserved water rights).  The great 
majority of Indian water rights went unexercised for many decades, sometimes for a century.  
However, they are not lost through non-use, like other water rights in the U.S.  Now that these 
rights have begun to be used, they have required very substantial changes in rights distributions 
(displacing a great number of existing users) and/or huge compensation packages. 
 Equity issues surrounding indigenous peoples can also affect water institutions by 
impacting water development policy.  For example, in India, the Sardar Sarovar dam on the 
Narmada River has brought serious opposition because it would submerge 37,000 hectares of 
land and inundate the traditional homeland of an estimated 67,000 indigenous Indian villagers 
(Newsarchives.indianinfo.com, 2003). While the project is intended to bring relief to a drought 
prone area of India, it is viewed by many as a large scale abuse of human rights bringing damage 
to many poor and underprivileged communities. Along with environmental concerns, this issue 
was a factor in the World Bank’s decision to pull funding.  While this equity issue is recognized 
widely as a significant concern, it has not altered the final decision on the dam, due to the weak 
political power of the effected group. 
 
Social Welfare  
 
 In some cases, the overall goal behind institutional change is more fundamental than 
changing the distribution of benefits and costs.  The concern may be the distribution of 
economic, legal and social opportunity (as distinct from economic outcomes) and the 
redistribution of economic advantage (Bromley, 1989).  The socially desired distribution of 
economic opportunity reflects a collective attitude about the appropriate social welfare function 
for the society. 
 Certainly, South Africa provides an example of how the overall issue of social welfare 
can be a critical factor influencing natural resource policy.  This has been the case for South 
Africa since the end of apartheid and democratic elections in 1994.  Basic access to water for the 
entire population, especially those disenfranchised in the apartheid era is a fundamental issue that 
South Africa is trying to address with changing water institutions (Backeberg, 2003). Balancing 
social welfare objectives with other goals (like cost recovery) is a problem facing a great many 
countries in the developing world. 
The current importance of social welfare as it pertains to water institutions is perhaps best 
illustrated by the very vocal (while perhaps small) international opposition to privatization of 
water resources (Gleick, et. al., Pacific Institute, 2003).  In this context, privatization refers to 
transferring some of the assets or operations of public water systems into private hands. While 
there are many concerns including environmental and equity issues, the main arguments against 
privatization that point to social welfare concerns are that 1) water provision is (should be) a 
basic responsibility of government, 2) privatization may bypass under-represented and under-
served communities, 3) privatization agreements often fail to include public participation and 
contract monitoring, 4) agreements may lack dispute resolution procedures and 5) privatization 
may be irreversible.   
This section provides an explanation of the individual motivations that lead individuals to 
seek change in water institutions and how the same set of goals can be used to evaluate potential 
or actual institutional change from an aggregate viewpoint.  The following section turns to the 
next level of evaluation at the meso, or middle, level of policymaking.  The meso level concerns 
the actual process of institutional change and the factors that may facilitate or pose obstacles, to 
innovation. 
 
III. EVALUATING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT THE MESO LEVEL 
 
In order to better understand the evolution of water institutions in practical terms and 
their impact on economic performance and other social goals, this section decomposes the 
overall broad notion of institutional change into typologies that capture key analytical and 
functional elements.  At the meso level, institutional change is evaluated in terms of the factors 
that influence the structure and sequencing of change. 
 
Nestedness and Stages of Change   
 
The breadth and depth of water institutions points to the “nestedness” of institutions.  The 
many levels of water institutions are structurally embedded within each other  (Saleth and Dinar, 
2003).  In this way, a particular rule governing water may be interlinked with a great variety of 
water rules, linked together by related institutions at many levels.  This interdependent structure 
is extremely important in terms of evaluating what kinds of change in water institutions may 
actually occur, and what their impact on the system might be. 
If several levels of institutions governing water are uncoordinated or conflicting, serious 
problems can arise in allocating water rationally and in making progressive changes in policy.  
Analysts in many countries cite fragmentation and uncoordinated policy as a problem in water 
institutions.  For example, in Australia, multiple states have adopted rules and regulations that 
fail to recognize cross border impacts, which has resulted in ecological damage and basic 
incompatibility in management systems including data collection (McKay, 2003). 
 When the basic forces stimulating change in fact materialize, actual institutional change 
occurs (if it occurs at all) in a stage-based process.  While one stage is a necessary prerequisite to 
the subsequent stage, the process may stop at any point, due to political social and economic 
obstacles.  Three fundamental stages include: 1) changes in the perception of needed institutional 
change, 2) political articulation of needed changes, 3) steps taken to make changes in water 
institutions operational and 4) the actual impact of institutional change (Saleth and Dinar, 2003).   
 The case of Namibia provides an example of how innovation in water institutions can be 
frustrated at one stage of the process (Heyns, 2003).  Since 1997, Namibia has gone through 
stages one and two of progressive change in water institutions.  The need for change has been 
perceived and politically articulated.  Unfortunately, these changes have encountered significant 
trouble in becoming operational, primarily due to the lack of staffing power and funding.  Even 
though water reform is based on sound rationale, efforts to make change a reality and produce 
positive impacts on the water sector have been frustrated. 
In the sections that follow, some key concepts that are helpful in evaluating the process of 
actual change are outlined.   These factors may affect one of the stages of institutional change.  
Moreover, there is a considerable feedback effect. Obviously, perception of need affects political 
articulation, which in turn may lead to operational changes.  In addition, the actual outcome of 
any institutional change (stage four) will influence social perceptions, which may well lead to 
another round of reform. 
 
The Role of Subjective and Objective Elements in Perception 
  
The perception of needed change in water institutions can result from subjective or 
objective elements. Two of the most important objective elements are technology and the 
physical environment. Subjective elements include the ideologies of individuals and groups, 
biases, and learning.   
It is easy to envision how changes in objective resource realities can lead to the 
perception that water institutions need to be changed.  For example, in Australia, the objective 
reality of serious groundwater overdrafts certainly contributed to the perception that collective 
caps on groundwater extractions were appropriate (Delforce, et. al., 1990).  In some cases, 
objective elements external to the water sector may contribute to the pressure for innovation in 
water institutions.  For example, in Mexico, broader economic realities, particularly debt relief 
problems, structural adjustment and the politics of international aid and lending has been a 
factor.  These elements have been important factors in terms of the growing pressure to liberalize 
the water sector (Hearne, 2003). 
Subjective elements are just as critical to changing perceptions of need for institutional 
change.  The “environmental movement” is a perfect illustration of how biases and ideology 
evolve by people learning (perhaps from each other).  Environmentalism is a “collective attitude” 
that has grown and definitely influences how individuals evaluate the world around them.  In 
New Zealand, it has been observed that the perception of need has evolved continuously from a 
focus on flooding, to pollution, to irrigation and then environment (Saleth and Dinar, 2003).  
While subjective perception is difficult to measure precisely, it can be estimated via contingent 
valuation and other techniques, like the Delphi method, that are utilized by economists.  
 The impact of this subjective view on institutional innovation is widespread.  It has led to 
the broad range of changes including the development of instream water rights and proposals to 
decommission dams (e.g., Hoover Dam) that symbolize past attempts to manage water resources.  
The role of subjective element of pro-environmental attitudes is not limited to democratic states.  
This bias was present, and growing, in former Soviet Bloc countries.  When Communism 
collapsed, these bias were transformed into political action and led to substantial innovations in 
natural resource policy, including those that apply to water resources. 
 
The Pervasiveness of Path Dependency 
  
In order to evaluate the prospect for reforms in water institutions in a particular country, 
it is critical to consider the significant role of path dependency.  Analytically, path dependency 
refers to the fact that potential changes in institutions are both constrained and enabled by past 
institutional configurations. Even when the range of possibilities is the same across countries, 
this does mean each country will face fairly different obstacles in initiating innovations. 
Path dependence is a factor that helps explain the variety of institutional approaches taken in 
specific countries, as well as very different rates and directions of change.   
Water institutions are linked with related (perhaps other natural resource) institutions, 
which are, in turn, structurally embedded within the larger legal and agency structure and indeed 
the overall structure of a particular national government. Path dependence resulting from the 
embeddedness of institutions means the choice of one institutional component can and usually 
will affect subsequent institutional arrangements.   For example, the general economic 
liberalizations effected by China, Spain, and many other countries in recent years have had 
positive impacts on the potential for liberalizing the water resource sector as well (Saleth and 
Dinar, 2003). 
 The impact of path dependency, at the broadest level, is clear for countries (like those in 
Central Europe), which were part of the former Soviet Bloc.  For example, the experience of the 
Czech Republic with a totalitarian regime, as well as its history as part of the Austria-Hungarian 
Empire, colors the opportunities and obstacles faced at this point in changing water institutions.  
Because the value of water associated with both fishing and aesthetic beauty were reflected in 
Austro-Hungarian laws of the 19th century, a historical foundation is established that will 
facilitate the ability of the Czech government to recognize these values in newly emerging water 
institutions (Sauer, 2003).  In addition, because of the heavy state role in the post World War II 
era, a centrally managed fund for water resource activities may also be less objectionable than in 
countries with a different experience. 
  
Institutional Transactions Costs 
 
 Once the need for institutional change is perceived, the process of reform requires that 
new policy alternatives are articulated and eventually implemented.  Essentially, in order for 
change to occur, the political powers that be must take advantage of opportunities and provide 
leadership.  In general, the obstacles that must be overcome, in this regard, can be labeled as 
transactions costs. 
 Transactions costs have been defined by Williamson (1985, p. 2) to be “the effort, time 
and expense necessary to obtain the information necessary to make an exchange, negotiate the 
exchange and enforce the exchange”.  These exchanges are essentially economic contracts.  
Traditionally, the notion of transactions costs referred to the ease or difficulty with which 
individual economic agents could operate within a given institutional structure.  Certainly, the 
traditional notion is relevant for many countries.  For example, in South Africa, recent reforms 
allowing trade in water rights became effective only after administrative authorities (the 
Crocodile River Main Irrigation Board) lowered transactions costs by providing both information 
and coordination services to farmers who were in a position to sell (Backeberg, 2003). 
This powerful concept can also be applied to the transactions costs of modifying existing 
institutions and/or creating new institutional arrangement. When applied to institutional change 
in the political, rather than economic, sphere, the transactions costs involved refer to costs 
perceived by political agents in initiating and effecting reforms.  To make matters more 
complicated, due to path dependency, the transactions costs change as the process occurs.  For 
example, the political transactions cost of moving the reform process to midstream and then 
returning to the status quo might be far greater than the transactions cost of a full successful 
reform.   
Within the political arena, political actors have considerable discretion in terms political 
contracts they choose to support or oppose.  For this reason, political leadership is a key element 
in evaluating the potential for institutional change.  As discretion grows, leadership and 
commitment to reform become more important. The potential for innovation may be “asset 
specific”, meaning that the possibilities for action may depend on the specific configuration of 
political actors and their relationship to each other.  
 Supporting an innovation in water institutions is inherently risky, as any deviation from 
the status quo will alter power and economic outcomes.  In the extreme, political careers may be 
at stake. This general principle can be illustrated by an air quality case in Poland.  In post 
communist Poland, resource policies were undergoing substantial innovations.  In 1992, the 
environmental minister suggested a substantial reduction in air pollution charges (by 30%).  
Scientists, environmentalists and industries which had already undertaken the investment to cut 
pollutants, protested.  Ultimately, the ministry backed down, and raised charges again.  This 
experience was a factor in the environmental minister’s resignation from office in 1993 
(Livingston, Bochniarz and Bolan, 1995).   This example point to the challenge of effecting 
change, without significant vacillation in policy, which can disrupt economic activity. 
 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper outlines how water institutions can be evaluated at the micro and meso level.  
At the micro level, the political economy model can assist in evaluating and understanding the 
individual stake holders involved and their diverse motives in seeking or resisting change in 
water institutions.  Just as importantly, the model helps to evaluate the political power of various 
stakeholders, and the likelihood that their aims will find political expression.  At the micro level, 
the model points to how evolving subjective interests and changing objective realities combine to 
shape the forces for institutional change. 
At the meso level, the model focuses on the probability that pressure at the micro level 
will result in actual change.  The role of political agents, and the structure of institutions in the 
status quo are critical.  Political actors will do their own assessment of the opportunities to be 
had by supporting, or initiating, a proposed institutional change as it compares to the transactions 
costs that will be incurred.  The status quo configuration constrains, to some extent, the range of 
possible reform.  By the same token, path dependence means that a modest change may lay the 
groundwork for substantial improvements in water institutions in the future. 
 In conclusion, economists have long been able to assess the narrow and specific 
economic impact of changes in water institutions.  However, the relatively new, developing and 
much broader political economy model of institutional innovation can help generate real insight 
into additional important aspects of change.  The concepts can help economists evaluate both the 
potential opportunity for beneficial (or detrimental) change and the obstacles that are likely to be 
encountered.  If addressed in a positive way, these concepts can help regions and countries to 
adapt to changing conditions and design water institutions that can yield real improvement in the 
use of water resources.  
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